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5AbstrAct
In light of the growing importance of finance ministries and the financial dimension 
in policy-making, opening up the “black box” of fiscal bureaucracies is more war-
ranted than ever. Our paper addresses the following research question: What kinds 
of roles can be assumed by fiscal bureaucrats in fiscal policy-making and budget-
ing? We propose four dichotomies that can be employed for examining the roles 
played by fiscal bureaucracies: 1) developers vs guardians; 2) initiators vs followers; 
3) mediators vs insulators; 4) modellers vs estimators. In developing these dimen-
sions, we juxtaposed the insights from various streams of institutionalist research 
and also literature on public budgeting and public policy with the themes that 
emerged from the interviews we conducted in four different countries: Estonia, 
Latvia, Sweden and Norway. We find that fiscal bureaucracies in Estonia and Latvia 
tend to be closer to the guardian-insulator-estimator ends of the continuums, where-
as the officials in Sweden and especially Norway lean towards the developer-medi-
ator-modeller end of the scale. The division between the initiator vs follower roles is 
less clear-cut.
Keywords: fiscal bureaucracy, fiscal policy, budgeting, comparative analysis
1. Introduction
A number of studies on fiscal governance have pointed to the increasing power of 
the finance ministries, following the recent financial, economic and fiscal crises 
(Allen et al. 2016; Di Mascio et al. 2013; Raudla et al. 2015). Finance ministries have 
already tended to be primi inter pares among the ministries since they are respon-
sible for “formulating and implementing the core financial functions of govern-
ment” and are “at the center of economic and fiscal policy-making” (Allen et al. 
2016, 3). The growing importance of the financial dimension in governance gives 
the finance ministries – and especially the “fiscal bureaucracy” part – an even big-
ger role in the governmental ecosystem. By “fiscal bureaucracy” we mean the civil 
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servants who are involved in and contribute to budgetary and fiscal policy; hence, it 
covers officials working for the departments of budgeting, fiscal policy and macro-
economic analysis in the finance ministries.
In light of their growing importance, it is somewhat curious that the finance 
ministries have received only limited attention in scholarly research so far. Indeed, 
as Allen et al. (2016, 4) put it, “the literature on the functions and organizational 
structure of finance ministries is relatively slim”. However, anecdotally, the power 
and importance of fiscal bureaucrats is rarely doubted, often feared and vilified as in 
this following exchange from Yes, Prime Minister (1986):
 James Hacker:  But that’s an outrageous view.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Yes indeed, it’s known as Treasury Policy.
Thus, it comes as a surprise that the role of bureaucracy in policy-making is an 
understudied question – or even a “missing variable” (Meier 2009, 7) – even 
though it is often admitted that bureaucrats can play a significant role in policy 
making (Baekgaard et al. 2015; Howlett 2011). If the volume of studies on finance 
ministries and the role of bureaucracies in policy-making is “slim”, the literature 
on fiscal bureaucracies is even thinner. In Krause’s (2012, 149) words: “Budget 
officials are bureaucrats but bureaucracy is mostly absent from literature on bud-
geting.” Given their increased power and relevance, however, it would be useful to 
open up the “black box” of fiscal bureaucracies and take a closer look at the kinds 
of roles they play and the types of “faces” they can have. In doing that, we have 
followed the call of Yesilkagit (2012, 35), who, when elaborating the future 
research agenda in the field of executive politics, called for “recalibrating” the 
images we have of bureaucracies by undertaking more studies about the bureau-
crats’ roles, beliefs and perceptions.
Thus, the research question this paper addresses is: What kinds of roles can be 
assumed by fiscal bureaucrats in fiscal policy-making and budgeting? While Allen et 
al. (2016) analyze the functions and organization of finance ministries as a whole, in 
this paper, we zoom in closer on the fiscal bureaucracy part of finance ministries. We 
propose four dichotomies that can be employed for examining the roles played by 
fiscal bureaucracies: 1) developers vs guardians; 2) initiators vs followers; 3) media-
tors vs insulators; 4) modellers vs estimators. In developing these dimensions, we 
juxtaposed the insights from various streams of institutionalist research and also on 
literature on public budgeting and public policy with the themes that emerged from 
the interviews we conducted in four different countries: Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and 
Norway. In each country, 5-6 semi-structured interviews were conducted with fiscal 
bureaucrats during the period of 2014-2016. In choosing the interviewees we fol-
lowed the logic of purposive sample and sought to cover officials who contribute to 
fiscal policy making and budgeting through different angles. The dichotomies we 
outline in this paper are, of course, continuums rather than binary in nature. For 
developing the first three dichotomies (developers vs guardians; initiators vs follow-
ers; mediators vs insulators) we were able to draw on the theoretical discussions in 
the existing literature. The last dichotomy (modeller vs estimator) emerged as an 
insight from our interviewees. It also points to a gap in the existing theoretical dis-
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cussions on comparative public policy and bureaucracy – since we could not find any 
studies that would discuss the use of macroeconomic models by fiscal bureaucracies.
In choosing the countries, our goal was to cover a sufficient diversity of settings 
while keeping the cases comparable. All four countries are unitary states, parliamen-
tary democracies with proportional electoral systems and coalition governments, and 
located in the same region. However, the two pairs − Estonia/Latvia and Sweden/
Norway − have very different characteristics in terms of prosperity, economic devel-
opment, styles of policy-making and ideational heritage. Sweden and Norway are 
older democracies, Estonia and Latvia newer ones. Sweden and Norway are high-
income countries, Estonia and Latvia on the medium level. Sweden and Norway 
have a long heritage of social democratic governments, while the Estonian and 
Latvian governments have, since the 1990s, been primarily driven by the neoliberal 
policy agenda. The countries also vary in terms of their integration with the European 
Union (EU). Estonia has been a Eurozone member since 2011, Latvia since 2014. 
Sweden is a full EU member but does not have the Euro. Norway is not a member, 
but it is closely integrated through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. 
By looking at the different settings, we can explore the variation in the perceived 
roles and faces of fiscal bureaucracies.
The main empirical goal of this paper is not to offer generalizations but to 
explore the nuances under the dichotomies we have proposed – to “fill them with 
life” and with the actual “voices” of the fiscal bureaucrats themselves. Thus, our aim 
is to provide a more nuanced discussion of fiscal bureaucracies than just focusing on 
the formal authority and institutional competencies would allow, and zoom in on the 
“subtler” roles they can play. We do point to some patterns where we observed them, 
but these should be viewed as tentative conjectures. In other words, the overall goal 
of our analysis was to explore the diversity of the attitudes rather than to converge 
on premature generalizations. The paper is structured as follows: sections 2-5 cover 
the four different dichotomies we have proposed, with each section first providing 
some theoretical considerations, followed by empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes 
with a discussion.
2. Guardians of the Purse or Developers of Economy?
In the literature on budgeting, finance ministries are usually expected to fulfil the 
role of the “guardian” of the purse (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Rubin 2016; Krause 
2012; Wildavsky 1986; Wildavsky and Caiden 2004). As Krause (2009, 3) puts it, 
“Modern finance ministries should be lean and mean guardians of public money.” 
While the line ministries have incentives to expand spending, the finance ministries 
also look at the revenue side and evaluate the overall tax burden. Indeed, the “per-
formance” of fiscal bureaucracies is usually evaluated by how well they manage to 
balance demands and available resources (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Krause 
2012). They are expected to take the “Treasury view”, be the “responsible house-
keeper” of the government (Wanna et al. 2003) and “discipline” the spending-prone 
line ministries.
The role of the “guardian” can be played out by adopting either a “macro” or a 
“micro” approach to budgeting (Krause 2009; Schick 1986, 1988). Macro-budgeting 
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is aimed at controlling the budget totals, leaving more discretion over the details of 
the budget to the line ministries. Micro-budgeting focuses on controlling the more 
detailed line-items, influencing the daily operations of spending ministries and essen-
tially acting as a “command and control post” (Schick 2001, 9). The general tendency 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
has been to move from micro-budgeting towards macro-budgeting, entailing a stricter 
control over the totals and relaxation of more detailed input controls (Schick 2001).
Alongside fulfilling the “guardian” role, fiscal bureaucrats can also be expected 
to consider the effects of the budget on economic development, i.e. to assume what 
we call a “developer” role. Given the increasing importance attributed to fiscal pol-
icy in the post-crisis period and extensive debates in the academic and policy com-
munities that have unfolded since the Great Recession (see, e.g. Ban 2015; Blyth 
2013; Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015; Vail 2014) we would also expect that fiscal 
bureaucracies had to (re)-reflect on what role fiscal policy could or should play in 
the development of the economy. The “developer” role can entail various tasks, rang-
ing from developing counter-cyclical fiscal policies and fine-tuning the economy to 
undertaking a more extensive role in using fiscal policy tools to promote favourable 
development of the economy.1 While not contradictory to the “guardian” role per se, 
combining the “Treasury view” with the “economic development” view can impose 
contradictory demands on the fiscal bureaucrats. Thus, we were interested in how 
these potentially conflicting imperatives influence the predominant role perceptions 
of the fiscal bureaucrats and their attitudes towards fiscal and budgetary policy-
making in the four countries covered in our study.
In all four countries, the overall approach to the budget process follows the top-
down approach of macro-budgeting, with Sweden being the clearest example (with 
its fixed multi-year expenditure ceilings) (Anderson et al. 2006; Downes et al. 2017; 
Kraan et al. 2009; Raudla 2010; Wehner et al. 2008). In all four countries, the inter-
viewed officials did indeed point to their “guardian” role in the budget process, 
sometimes even using the very same term. As the Latvian officials put it: “We play 
the role of defender and keep the spirit of fiscal discipline because currently there is 
a real desire to spend” (Interview L2). “We serve the role of a watchdog, who’s bark-
ing all the time” (Interview L6). In Estonia, the interviewees repeatedly emphasized 
that their role is to “keep the house in order”, very much echoing the “responsible 
housekeeper metaphor” described above. A Swedish official remarked, “Spending 
ministries tend to exaggerate their expenditure forecasts and we usually follow a rule 
of thumb to adjust them downwards” (Interview S6). The “guardian” orientation was 
particularly clear in the case of officials working for the budgeting departments, 
which are in charge of gathering the spending proposals and negotiating with the line 
ministries. Even in Norway, where the scarcity of resources is somewhat lower than 
in the other countries, the interviewee noted that, “We have the oil revenue, but still, 
the politicians need to prioritize. They need to stop doing things and propose cuts and 
savings in order to prosper” (Interview N4).
1  This can take different forms from spending rules to managing public development banks or state-
owned companies. We also have to remember that many central banks were governed by respective Treasuries 
up to the latter decades of the 20th century, i.e. they were not autonomous (O’Connell 2014).
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The guardian role of the fiscal bureaucracy has become more complicated in recent 
years, given that the EU fiscal rules pertain to the general government sector, 
which, in addition to the central government also includes local governments and 
state-owned and municipal enterprises. That means that if the latter run higher 
deficits, the central government has to lower its deficit in order to make sure that the 
general government deficit meets the EU target(s). Thus, in Estonia and Latvia, for 
example, local governments have to obtain a permission from the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) in order to incur a loan – which adds another dimension to the MoF’s 
guardian role.
It emerged from the interviews that there are other, more subtle ways to exercise 
the guardian role than exercising a direct control of the expenditures in the annual 
state budget. Increasingly, the fiscal bureaucrats in the four countries have been in 
charge of designing fiscal rules – either as a result of the EU mandates (in Estonia 
and Latvia) or on their own initiative (in Sweden and Norway).
This more nuanced “guardian” role can be observed particularly clearly in the 
case of Estonia, where the interviewed officials admitted that when writing the new 
fiscal rule − the structural balance requirement − into the new organic budget law in 
2013, it was the initiative of the fiscal policy department’s officials to establish a 
stricter target than was foreseen by the European mandate. While the Fiscal Compact 
required the member states to establish a structural deficit target of 0.5% of GDP, the 
Estonian fiscal bureaucracy proposed (and succeeded in) establishing a structural 
balance target (see also Raudla et al. 2016a). The fiscal bureaucrats also designed an 
automatic compensation mechanism (in the form of having to run budget surpluses), 
should it turn out, ex post, that a government has violated the structural balance rule. 
This was another requirement, which was not, in fact, covered by the European man-
date. The fiscal bureaucrats hoped that these provisions would serve as additional 
checks on fiscal discipline. As one of the interviewed officials explained: “The cur-
rent government is fiscally responsible but future governments may not be. Thus, we 
have been more conservative [in designing the fiscal rules in the new organic budget 
law] in order to avoid getting immediately into a big mess, should a more profligate 
government get into office. The stricter provisions in the organic budget law will 
hopefully keep the future governments in check” (Interview E2).
The fiscal rules, in turn, provide the MoF officials with a focal point in their 
“guardian” role: the rules allow them to take a firmer stance towards the line minis-
tries. In Estonia and Latvia, it is the structural deficit (or balance) rule and multi-
annual expenditure ceilings, adopted as a result of the requirements of the Fiscal 
Compact; in Sweden, it is the surplus target and multi-year expenditure ceilings; in 
Norway, the fiscal rule stipulating how much of the oil (or pension) fund can be 
utilized annually.2 We also observed, however, that while the fiscal rules can 
strengthen the position of the fiscal bureaucracy in the budget process, vis-à-vis other 
actors, such rules can also impose contradictory demands on them. In the case of 
Norway, for example, the idea of the fiscal rule is to restrict spending of oil revenues 
to the return on the oil fund, but since the rule applies to a whole business cycle, it 
2  The Norwegian rule established a reference level for the budget deficit: over the business cycle, the 
deficit should equal the expected real return (4 per cent) of the petroleum fund (Mjøset and Cappelen 2011).
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does not entirely rule out the kind of political business cycle behaviour (government 
spending timed to elections) that fiscal bureaucrats want to avoid. Furthermore, such 
rules can force the “guardians” to adopt “creative” approaches in order to comply 
with the rules. A Swedish official explained that in order to adhere to the expenditure 
ceilings, the MoF has used some “canny” solutions (e.g. postponing payments) to 
make sure that formally the rules are followed (Interview S6). As he emphasized, 
such an approach is necessary for avoiding a slippery slope: “Once the expenditure 
ceiling is exceeded, it is much easier to exceed it also next year. … So we have a dual 
role of defending the system as a whole but in order to provide the needed flexibil-
ity, especially in more urgent situations where expenditure cuts cannot be undertak-
en, we have to introduce measures that more or less circumvent the rules” (Interview 
S6). Thus, in a paradoxical way, strict fiscal rules can force the guardians to “circum-
navigate” the rules in order to “keep” the rules.
As mentioned above, the identification with the “guardian” role is particularly 
evident in the case of the officials working for the budget departments. When look-
ing at the fiscal bureaucracies as a broader group of officials (including also those 
from departments dealing with fiscal policy, economic policy, and/or macro-eco-
nomic analysis), the diversity of views with regard to the position in the “guardian 
vs developers” continuum is more pronounced, both between countries and within 
them. We explored these themes with the help of more general questions (e.g. asking 
the civil servants to outline the goals of fiscal policy) but also with more specific 
questions (e.g. how would they react in the case of recession, what is their evaluation 
of recent fiscal policy actions). Finally, in order to locate their answers in a broader 
ideational context, we posed questions with an explicit reference to Keynesian ideas 
and whether such ideas are or could be applied in their country.
In all four countries, the interviewees’ views were similar with regard to what the 
general goals of fiscal policy should be. They all agreed that fiscal policy should be 
counter-cyclical, play a role in economic stabilization and foster economic develop-
ment. We could, however, observe differences among the interviewees with regard 
to what it would mean in terms of specific policy actions. In Sweden and Norway 
– when asked the question, “if a recession were to hit your country next year, what 
would the response be?” – all the officials answered that the government would 
respond with a fiscal stimulus. One of the Norwegian officials noted that in 2016 and 
2017 they would, in fact, have “expansionary fiscal policy to counteract the down-
turn in the economy” (Interview N2). One of the Swedish officials explained that in 
order to stimulate the demand, the government could increase the child allowance, 
spend more money on the municipalities, and increase the infrastructure and housing 
investments (Interview S4). Another noted, “It is important to get people back to 
work” (Interview S3). In Estonia and Latvia, the answers to the same question (“how 
would you react to a recession?”) were more divided: some officials argued for con-
solidation measures, others for stimulus measures.3
Also, when evaluating the actions taken during the most recent recession, we can 
observe considerable differences between the assessments of the interviewees. The 
3  At the same time, most of the officials in all four countries noted that in order to be ready for the next 
crisis, it is important to build reserves – so that there would be fiscal space for taking actions.
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Swedish and Norwegian officials all pointed to fiscal stimulus measures that were 
undertaken in 2008-2010 and found them justified, although there were diverging 
views between the officials with regard to whether the measures were too small or 
too large, in hindsight. Some of the Swedish interviewees noted, however, with a 
view to the 1990s crisis, that in some cases, fiscal consolidation may improve the 
economic situation. As one of the officials explained, “In the 1990s we had this big 
fiscal crisis and there was a lot of discussion of non-Keynesian effects − that budget 
cuts could actually stimulate the economy. The evaluations afterwards of whether 
that was true or not have shown mixed results. Some findings indicate that when you 
have such a big fiscal crisis – we had a deficit of more than 10 per cent of GDP and 
exploding central government debt – it is possible that budgetary retrenchments 
could actually be expansionary because you increase the trust” (Interview S6).4 The 
interviewee added, however, “In a normal situation, when you have sustainable pub-
lic finances – at least relatively sustainable – as in Sweden today, then an expansion-
ary fiscal stance has a positive demand effect on the economy and budgetary cuts 
would have the opposite effects” (Interview S6). In Latvia, all the interviewed offi-
cials found the consolidation measures in response to the recent crisis justified – with 
the arguments echoing the same aspects as those mentioned by the Swedish official. 
In Estonia, some of the officials saw the consolidation measures as fully justified, 
whereas others suggested that perhaps they went too far and were contractionary.5
When asked to evaluate the current state of fiscal policy, both in Sweden and 
Norway, however, the officials expressed concerns over excessively expansionary 
fiscal policy. The interviews with the Swedish officials also indicated concerns over 
the potentially overly expansionary fiscal policy: “We are not being as careful with 
the money as we should be in fiscal policy, given that we are going through good 
times, labour market and production-wise. The government is over-expanding the 
economy now” (Interview S3). “Our GDP gap now is close to zero or even positive. 
We are now close to full utilization of resources and to avoid expansionary fiscal 
policy we should go back to surplus” (Interview S6). In the Norwegian context, par-
ties represented in the parliament can demand that the party’s budget proposal is 
checked on the macroeconomic models maintained by Statistics Norway. Commenting 
on one of these exercises, a Norwegian official complained, “On fiscal policy they 
are a bit soft. They had some analysis a few years ago when they saw additional 
spending of 40-45 bn NOK on infrastructure every year. I found it to be too stupid 
in a way. … It was then used in parliament for arguing for more spending in a situ-
ation where we didn’t really need it” (Interview N3). Referring to discussions on 
whether the Norwegian fiscal rule should be tightened by lowering the 4 per cent 
estimated return to 3 per cent, another official noted that the 4 per cent estimate 
“could give too high impulses to the Norwegian economy in a situation where we 
actually need to transform, and if you push too much money into the economy, that 
could stop the transformation you need rather than helping it” (Interview N1). In the 
Estonian case, we could observe a noteworthy diversity – even contradictions – 
4  For academic discussions on the issue, see, e.g., Erixon (2015), Flodén (2013).
5  For an overview of the consolidation measures undertaken in Estonia and Latvia, see Raudla and 
Kattel (2013) and Kattel and Raudla (2013).
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among the attitudes of fiscal bureaucrats with regard to the “development” dimen-
sions of fiscal policy. On the one hand, all the interviewees repeatedly noted that, 
indeed, an important function of the fiscal policy is to be counter-cyclical, to smooth 
the economic cycle and to stabilize the economy. On the other hand, the perception 
of the political reality is different. As one of the officials noted, “The idea that we 
should stimulate the economy in order to close the GDP gap is still somewhat alien 
here” (Interview E3). Also, while some of the officials support counter-cyclical eco-
nomic policy, in principle, they appear to be reluctant to actually implement it by 
incurring loans. As one of the officials argued, “I do not support the idea of incurring 
loans … The ideas that politicians are proposing for incurring loans are idiotic” 
(Interview E2).
In a similar vein, in Latvia, the overall attitude of fiscal bureaucracy appears to 
be that fiscal policy has a significant role to play in economic development and 
stabilization. However, as in Estonia, there is a reluctance to implement such a 
policy in reality – due to distrust towards the politicians. A Latvian official explained 
that in light of the low public debt level and low interest rates, running small deficits 
would be justified, and the loans could be used for financing infrastructure spend-
ing. The interviewee added, however, that “We don’t really trust our decision-
makers: if we allow them to have a greater deficit, we cannot be sure that they 
would use it for investment. Instead they might spend it on consumption or pensions 
or something else that is politically profitable. Thus, our attitude is that we would 
be better off by not borrowing: that enables us to have lower debt maintenance 
expenses” (Interview L4).
When asked explicitly about their attitudes towards Keynesian-style fiscal poli-
cy-making and the applicability of Keynesian ideas in their country, the Norwegian 
fiscal bureaucracy appears to be most comfortable with it and they all agreed that 
Norwegian fiscal policy follows Keynesian principles. As one of the interviewees put 
it, “I think that Keynesian ideas are basically there in all institutions in Norway that 
are discussing economic policy” (Interview N1). According to another, “We have a 
very long tradition in Norway for using fiscal policy actively in stabilizing the 
economy, and that goes back several decades” (Interview N3). Another official noted 
that although since 2001, when the fiscal rule and the inflation target were intro-
duced, monetary policy in Norway has been given the main role in stabilizing the 
economy, fiscal policy still plays a role during large fluctuations (as was the case in 
2008-2009) (Interview N2). In Sweden, the interviewees also supported a counter-
cyclical role for fiscal policy and noted that there is more widespread agreement 
about the importance of Keynesian-style activist fiscal policy after the crisis. They 
also interpreted the existing fiscal framework in Keynesian terms. As one of the 
interviewees explained, the expenditure ceilings still allowed for counter-cyclical 
action: “Those who criticized our actions during the recession, neglected the fact that 
the expenditure ceiling is expressed in nominal terms and at the same time we had a 
drop in inflation, in prices, in wages, and that counteracted the effect on nominal 
expenditures” (Interview S6).
In Estonia and Latvia, the attitudes towards Keynesian fiscal policy are more 
ambivalent. In Estonia, on the one hand, the interviews indicate that the officials tend 
to re-interpret the austerity measures in 2009-2010 as having been at least partially 
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“Keynesian” in nature and having provided a boost for the economy (see also Raudla 
et al. 2016b). Thus, while during the austerity period itself (2008-2010), Keynesian 
ideas were criticized in Estonia (see Raudla and Kattel 2011), in light of increasing 
acceptance of the Keynesian ideas following the crisis period in the international 
arena, the officials have felt the need to justify their policies also in those terms (see 
Raudla et al. 2016a, b). On the other hand, as discussed above, the interviews also 
indicate that there is clear reluctance by the fiscal bureaucracy to engage in borrow-
ing, which would constrain implementing Keynesian policy actions in reality. In 
Latvia, on the one hand, the interviewees acknowledge that the Keynesian ideas of 
stabilizing the economy with fiscal measures are important, but, on the other hand, 
they are still convinced of the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation and are 
also sceptical of engaging in borrowing. As one of the officials explained, “If we 
compare the Keynesian theory that is taught in the university with what is going on 
in real life, we can see that the case of Latvia proves that in general we could restore 
growth by taking the path of expenditure cuts” (Interview L3).
As the discussion above shows, fiscal bureaucracies have more varied “faces” 
than just the “lean mean guardian”. The interviews indicate that the “guardian vs 
developer” continuum we proposed can indeed be a useful heuristic for exploring 
the role(s) of fiscal bureaucracy in a comparative setting. Overall, most of the fiscal 
bureaucrats especially in Norway but also in Sweden are closer to the “developer” 
role than the officials in Estonia and Latvia. At the same time, however, the inter-
views indicate that there can be considerable diversity in the role orientations also 
among the fiscal bureaucrats within the same country. Especially with the officials 
working for the budget departments – responsible for compiling the annual budget 
– the “guardian” orientation is dominant, whereas the civil servants from other parts 
of the fiscal bureaucracy tend to have more “developer” orientations. We can also 
see from the interviews that working in fiscal bureaucracy can often entail oscilla-
tion between the guardian and the developer role, with the civil servants trying to 
find a complicated balance between the contradictory demands placed on them. 
With the paradigm fights about the role of fiscal policy unfolding on the interna-
tional arena, the fiscal bureaucracies are also likely to find themselves in the cross-
fire of incongruous ideas, which may make it difficult to devise a more coherent 
policy agenda.
3. Initiators vs Followers
The second dichotomy for examining the roles of fiscal bureaucracy entails looking 
at whether the civil servants initiate policy changes or view themselves in the role 
of a “follower” who implements the decisions coming from “above”. As emerged 
from the interviews, it would be fruitful, however, to explore the “initiator vs fol-
lower” continuum at two levels: first, with regard to the politicians within the coun-
try and second, with a view to the supra-national context of policy-making and 
especially with reference to the European Union.
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3.1 Bureaucrats vis-à-vis Politicians
The classical Weberian dichotomy of politicians setting goals and drawing up laws 
and policies, and administrators implementing them has long been questioned 
(Baekgaard et al. 2015; Hansen and Ejersbo 2002; Page and Jenkins 2005; Svara 
1998). The division of labour between politicians and administrators is more com-
plex – and their interactions and roles more diverse – than this dichotomy conveys. 
Administrators can be closely involved in formulating policy objectives, and politi-
cians may be involved in specific constituency cases (Hansen and Ejersbo 2002; 
Page and Jenkins 2005).
Although the conventional vision often tends to cloak the role of the bureaucrats 
in “gray robes of anonymous neutrality” (Aberbach et al. 1981, 5), the civil servants 
working for the fiscal bureaucracy can influence policy-making in various ways. 
Importantly, they can structure the flow of advice politicians receive (Hall 1989; 
Page and Jenkins 2005). As Baekgaard et al. (2015) explain, elected officials are 
likely to consider only “few facets of a multifaceted matter” when paying attention; 
thus, what “passes through their bottleneck of attention” can be significantly influ-
enced by bureaucracy (Baekgaard et al. 2015, 460) and hence influence the strategic 
calculations of the elected officials (Oliver and Pemberton 2004). Thus, bureaucrats 
can play a major role in policy-making by diagnosing problems6, outlining alterna-
tives to deal with them, formulating policy proposals, and assessing the feasibility of 
policy alternatives (Baekgaard et al. 2015; Heclo 1974; Page and Jenkins 2005; 
Skocpol 1985). In addition to these straightforward avenues for influencing policy-
making, the bureaucrats can shape policies by articulating the language of a specific 
policy, deliberately “framing” and “packaging” certain policy ideas to convince the 
elected officials (Campbell 1998).
In the field of fiscal policy – with its increasing technicality and need for expert 
input into devising policies – we can expect the civil servants to play a growing role 
in policy-making (Peters 2002). As Christensen (2013, 569) has pointed out, “techni-
cal expertise can augment the policy influence of officials by increasing their ability 
to set the policy agenda (active role), to evaluate and counter the policy proposals of 
politicians (reactive role), and to warn politicians about deficiencies of existing 
policies (proactive role).” On the other hand, it could be argued that the “fiscal” 
domain is still inherently political (Wildavsky and Caiden 2004), which would make 
it highly salient to elected officials and hence potentially less permeable to bureau-
cratic influences (Baekgaard et al. 2015). Indeed, politicians may have less informa-
tion about technical matters in less salient areas but might be more informed on 
politically more salient sectors (Baekgaard et al. 2015). Furthermore, as Peters 
(2002) has posited, civil servants who work for “super-bureaucracies” or coordinat-
ing organizations within government, like the finance ministries, are likely to have 
more “subservient” attitudes vis-à-vis their political masters: “if a civil servant is 
willing to accept a position in one of these organizations, this implies a willingness 
to accept the wishes of his political executives” (276). Thus, we might expect the 
6  Indeed, in addition to proposing policy solutions, they can influence policy through “problem defini-
tions”, and the way problems become framed influences the policy solutions (Mehta 2010).
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fiscal bureaucracies to “have a special relationship to politics” and be “charged with 
implementing the wishes of a government to perhaps a greater extent than civil ser-
vants in operating departments” (ibid.).
In order to capture their role in policy-making – and to explore whether they are 
closer to being active initiators of policies or just neutral followers of political 
instructions7 – we delved into various themes in our interviews, including open ques-
tions about how the officials view the existing division of labour between civil ser-
vants and elected officials in fiscal policy-making, where new initiatives tend to 
come from, and what the officials view as the main contribution to fiscal policy-
making.
Overall attitudes towards politicians’ role in fiscal policy-making
While all the interviewees in all four countries emphasized that in a democracy, 
final policy decisions should be taken by politicians, we could also observe consid-
erable variations among the interviewed officials in their assessments of politicians’ 
role in fiscal policy-making.
There were significant differences between the countries with regard to how 
much the civil servants trust the politicians. As was already pointed out in section 2, 
in Estonia and Latvia, the civil servants display considerable degrees of distrust 
towards the elected officials. In Estonia, the mistrust concerns primarily how the 
politicians spend the borrowed money, whereas in Latvia it pertains to “excessive” 
fiscal profligacy of the politicians overall, alongside with the misgivings about their 
spending priorities. In the words of the officials: “This idea about fiscal discipline, is 
the idea that we are nursing [within the bureaucracy], and not really an idea that 
comes from politicians” (Interview L2). “In the heads of politicians, it seems that the 
idea of a strict framework for fiscal policy, that you have to save in the good years 
in order to spend in the bad ones, is still not acceptable” (Interview L2). “The polit-
ical parties are too populist in their approach to fiscal policy. We still have a long way 
to go to political maturity” (Interview L3). In contrast, in the Swedish and Norwegian 
context, the trust towards politicians seems to be considerably higher than in Estonia 
or Latvia. As one of the Norwegian officials explained, “We may rely more on 
political decisions than some other countries, for instance Sweden. But I think that it 
is closer to the democratic ideal. From my point of view, I cannot really see any huge 
costs in involving politicians – Norwegian politicians at least – in quite a lot of 
issues, because I don’t really feel that they have a polluted agenda or agenda that 
somehow makes decisions less effective to a great extent” (Interview N1). Another 
interviewee explained, “In the academic world, many researchers take the opposite 
view, that you need fiscal councils, you need fiscal rules to prevent the politicians 
from doing something irresponsible, which they would always do. And that is taken 
7  According to the existing literature (e.g. Heclo 1975), we could, in principle, label the “followers” as 
“neutral competents”. However, since the initiators are also likely to be highly competent, the initiators vs 
neutral competents dichotomy might be somewhat misleading. The “follower vs initiator” dichotomy helps us 
more accurately to capture the differences in the overall stance that the bureaucrats may have towards policy-
making.
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as given. The starting point in Norway is completely different. There are not that 
many people involved in fiscal policy: it is the minister of finance, it is the prime 
minister, a few people in the parliament. And they take the responsibility, and they 
should take the responsibility, and we should not weaken them in any way. It has 
worked well so far” (Interview N3).
It is also noteworthy that despite the frustrations that fiscal bureaucrats may have 
vis-à-vis their political masters, especially in Estonia and Latvia, they do appear to 
appreciate “clarity” and “decisiveness” from their principals. One of the Latvian 
officials explained it as follows, “It is very difficult for bureaucrats to suggest and to 
develop policy, if the position from the political side isn’t really clear” (Interview 
L2). Another noted, “Since the budget is the main instrument for governing the coun-
try, it is the task of politicians. There should be a clear position in their political 
programmes whether they see the country as more social democratic or more liberal” 
(Interview L3). One of the Estonian interviewees complained that “If policy initia-
tives come from the politicians, these are often populist slogans” (Interview E3). 
Another official argued that “Politicians should be more decisive, in the sense that 
painful decisions should be made earlier in the budgetary cycle (e.g. in spring) and 
not in the fall. They keep on hoping that if they postpone a painful decision, maybe 
things improve and they don’t have to adopt it” (Interview E1).
With regard to the advice fiscal bureaucracies give to politicians, we could 
observe varying perceptions of how it plays out. On the one hand, there were offi-
cials – especially in Norway – who appreciated the political need for advice. “What 
is nice about how things function in this house [the Ministry of Finance] is that 
politicians want our advice. That’s without exception really. We change governments 
but they want to have advice” (Interview N1). “It is fair to say that politicians listen 
to us to a large extent. Compared to other countries, I think we have influence on 
fiscal policy” (Interview N2). On the other hand, several interviewees in Estonia and 
Latvia complained that the politicians do not ask or listen to the bureaucracy’s advice 
sufficiently. One of the Latvian officials noted, “Unfortunately, when politicians 
make decisions, they don’t often consult with bureaucrats or listen to them before 
making that decision” (Interview L3). An Estonian official quipped, “Ideally, politi-
cians should say what the problem is and civil servants could then outline alternative 
solutions to the problem. However, politicians don’t usually start with formulating a 
problem that needs to be solved but already come with a solution” (Interview E3).
Where do policy initiatives come from? How much freedom do the officials have in mak-
ing the proposals?
In all four countries, according to our interviews, fiscal bureaucrats play an active 
role in identifying policy problems, initiating policies, formulating policy proposals, 
communicating them to the elected officials, and persuading them. Thus, they do 
not just wait for signals from their political principals but also act on their own ini-
tiative. Overall, our interviews indicate that policy proposals tend to originate more 
from the civil servants than from the politicians. As an Estonian official stated, “We 
have taken the role of policy designers and don’t expect guidelines from the govern-
ment” (interview E4). In the words of a Norwegian official, “We are not just sitting 
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and waiting. We are worried all the time” (Interview N2). In all countries, the offi-
cials pointed to varying success in persuading the elected officials of their proposals 
– sometimes they succeed, sometimes they did not.
Also, in all countries, the interviewees noted that the civil servants usually make 
a proposal with regard to what the budget position should be (e.g. how large the 
deficit or surplus should be) whereas the politicians are responsible for the expendi-
ture and revenue decisions. Even here, however, the civil servants sometimes have 
to venture into more political domains: “If politicians want to spend more, we may 
get a task to find revenues for covering those – and finding new revenues entails 
making political proposals” (Interview E2).
In the Norwegian context, the important role of committees in generating policy 
proposals was noted as well, “It is often so that if the politicians want something to 
be done in an area, they set up a commission that figures out how to do it” (Interview 
N2). The interviewees also explained that while in many other countries such com-
missions are totally independent from the ministries, in Norway, the civil servants 
usually form the secretariat for these commissions. Thus, the close connection to 
these committees gives the Norwegian fiscal bureaucracy additional clout in making 
policy proposals.
The fiscal bureaucrats in all four countries noted that in the power balance 
between the civil servants and the elected officials, information plays a major role. 
As one of the Estonian officials put it, “Politicians don’t often understand many top-
ics in fiscal policy. Thus, our role is to help them decide. … They could have a big-
ger role in fiscal policy-making if they were more informed” (Interview E2). 
Another noted, “Cabinet meetings are short; so we [the finance ministry] are the 
competence centre that has all the necessary information” (Interview E4). A Latvian 
civil servant explained it as follows: “In reality, the Ministry of Finance has rela-
tively few constraints, because a significant amount of the proposals come from 
bureaucracy. Elected officials have very few things to offer because they don’t have 
access to information and the analytical capacity. Macro-level objectives are set by 
politicians but when it comes to the mechanisms and means to reach these objec-
tives, the bureaucracy plays a great role and has substantial freedom. Often there 
isn’t really a high quality alternative solution to what bureaucracy offers” (Interview 
L4). A Swedish official also noted, “When you are dealing with the technical details, 
then of course civil servants can influence decisions. … But we try to influence the 
bigger decisions as well … with the help of models and calculations” (Interview S5). 
At the same time, in the Swedish case, it was emphasized several times that Andres 
Borg, for example, was technically very competent as a finance minister, and that 
gave him significant power vis-à-vis the bureaucracy in the finance ministry. In 
Latvia, too, it was noted that when Valdis Dombrovskis (a former chief economist 
at the Bank of Latvia) was prime minister and Andris Vilks (a former chief econo-
mist of the SEB Latvian branch) was the finance minister, both considered to be very 
competent economists, the politicians’ power vis-à-vis the civil servants was consid-
erably enhanced.
With regard to how free the civil servants feel in making policy proposals, most 
of the interviewees in all four countries perceive that they have considerable free-
dom. In the Estonian context, however, we could observe diverging assessments 
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about that. While some of the interviewed Estonian officials feel that they are free to 
propose any ideas and policy alternatives to the politicians, others (especially from 
the lower ranks of the hierarchy) believe that they have to exercise some “self-
restraint”. As one of the officials put it, “We are free to make proposals but every-
body knows which proposals are worth making. … Certain fundamentals are fixed 
and cannot be challenged and there is not much to discuss” (Interview E1). Another 
admitted, “There is a lot of self-censorship among civil servants with regard to fiscal 
policy ideas. Everybody knows which ideas are welcome and which not. The sur-
vival instinct is strong and nobody wants to have a conflict with a superior during 
uncertain economic times” (Interview E3). He added that “Together with some col-
leagues we have tried to expand the range of topics to discuss but without any real 
outlet. For most other officials the parameters of fiscal policy are so fixed that they 
don’t even attempt to think outside it” (Interview E3).
In sum, although according to the predictions of Peters (2000), fiscal bureaucrats 
should have relatively “harmonious” relationships with their political masters − 
approximating what he calls the “Village Life” model of political-administrative 
relations, with the elected officials and the civil servants sharing common values and 
policy goals – our interviews indicate that this is not necessarily the case. While in 
Sweden and especially Norway, the interactions between politicians and civil ser-
vants in fiscal bureaucracy come pretty close to the depiction of the “Village Life”, 
the relationships between the fiscal bureaucrats and politicians are considerably 
more adversarial in Estonia and especially Latvia, where we can observe consider-
able degrees of distrust towards the political masters.
3.2 Fiscal Bureaucracy vis-à-vis the European Union
On the one hand, fiscal bureaucracies can choose where they fall on the “initiator vs 
follower” role vis-à-vis the political “masters” in their own country. On the other 
hand, the civil servants can also play the follower vs initiator role in the suprana-
tional context. This dimension is particularly relevant for Estonia and Latvia, which 
are both members of the EU and the Eurozone but also for Sweden, which is a mem-
ber of the EU. Given the increasing role of the financial dimension in the EU, we 
can expect there to be close interactions between the fiscal bureaucrats and the EU 
in those three countries. Yesilkagit (2012, 28) even goes as far as to conjecture that 
finance ministries “have essentially become the national branches of the European 
Commission rather than ministries of the national state.”
In the EU context, the civil servants of the member states play an important part 
by negotiating and bargaining with other countries’ civil servants in Brussels (Börzel 
and Risse 2003; Radaelli 2003, 2008; Weiler 1999; Yesilkagit 2012). Also, bureau-
cratic responses to EU mandates influence significantly whether and how EU poli-
cies get implemented at the national level (Knill and Lenschow 2005). Thus, in 
communicating between the national and the European levels they can help to medi-
ate “the forces of integration and Europeanization” (Jordan 2003, 268). On the con-
tinuum of initiator vs follower, the fiscal bureaucrats can occupy different positions 
in the supranational context. First, domestic civil servants can take an active initiator 
role and attempt to upload “national models by defining the scope of issues before 
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they become solidified in Commission proposals” and to work “in EU committees to 
mitigate the potential impact of new legislation before it is ‘downloaded’ from the 
EU” (Jordan 2003, 268). Or, they can assume the role of a “reluctant follower” or 
even “saboteur”: if the national preferences are not reflected in the EU decisions, 
they can seek to minimize adjustment costs by engaging in partial (rather than full) 
implementation (Jordan 2003; Knill and Lenschow 2005). They can also play a sig-
nificant role by “translating” a new rule into the local context and offering localized 
re-(interpretations) of the rules (Campbell 2004; Gutierrez 2010; Irvine 2011). Or, 
they can adopt a predominantly “follower” role by just transposing the EU mandates.
It is also likely that the increasing involvement of the fiscal bureaucracies in the 
supra-national policy-making venues of the European Union is likely to affect the 
bureaucrats’ interactions with elected officials in their own countries. Yesilkagit 
(2012, 20) has noted that despite the growing role of the EU in the political lives of 
its member states, very little is known about the possible effects of Europeanization 
on the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats.
Our interviews indicate that while the fiscal bureaucracies in Estonia and Latvia 
tend to be “initiators” vis-à-vis the politicians in their own countries, they are very 
much in the “follower” role in the multi-level governance context of the EU. All the 
interviewed officials in both Estonia and Latvia repeatedly emphasized that the main 
directions of fiscal policy in their country is shaped by the European Union. As one 
of the Latvian officials put it, “It wouldn’t be correct to state that we develop our own 
fiscal policy in Latvia. I would even go as far as to say that fiscal policy here is the 
EU fiscal policy” (Interview L3). Participation in EU policy-making does empower 
the bureaucrats vis-à-vis their political masters, by increasing their technical knowl-
edge and also by giving them a clear starting point in proposing and drafting legisla-
tion. However, at least in the small-country contexts of Estonia and Latvia, the 
bureaucrats tend to be predominantly in a “follower” position vis-à-vis the suprana-
tional authorities.
In Sweden, the officials have adopted much less of a “follower” approach in 
relation to the European Union. One of the interviewed officials stated that the EU 
does not affect fiscal policy debates in Sweden significantly. He added, “I think we 
have finally signed the fiscal pact, or whatever it is called, but we said that we won’t 
apply it. So we are in it with the typical Swedish EU attitude – we are in but not 
really” (Interview S1). Another official emphasized that Sweden created its fiscal 
framework with the expenditure ceilings, surplus target and the fiscal council on its 
own initiative; thus, “other countries have learnt from us” (Interview S6). Another 
interviewee noted that Sweden has designed “a pretty good system for fiscal policy”, 
and the officials like the approach; hence, “the EU coming, saying ‘you should do 
this now’ can irritate a lot of people here” (Interview S3). He added that the approach 
to policy-making in Sweden is very much consensus-based and the EU saying “this 
is how you should do that …” is just not the right way to approach Sweden, if they 
want it to be on board.
The Norwegian officials noted that the EU does not play an important role in fiscal 
policy-making in Norway. Out of the external actors, the OECD appears to have a 
more significant influence than the EU on the adopted reforms. For example, the 
OECD report recommended a productivity reform, which was adopted (Interview N4).
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In sum, it appears that using the “initiator vs follower” continuum for comparatively 
exploring fiscal bureaucracies in different countries can provide useful insights about 
the varying roles civil servants can play in fiscal policy-making. We can also see that 
being an “initiator” in the national arena does not automatically translate into being an 
“initiator” in the supra-national setting. While in Estonia and Latvia, the fiscal bureau-
cracies assume very much an initiator role vis-à-vis the politicians in their own coun-
tries, they play a predominantly follower role in the EU context. We can also see that 
although Sweden, like Estonia and Latvia, is a member of the EU, the fiscal bureau-
crats there have less of a “follower” attitude and more of a “bargainer” attitude in rela-
tion to the EU. In Norway, in contrast, the civil servants view themselves to be in more 
of a “follower” position vis-à-vis elected officials but not internationally speaking.
We can also see that – as was the case with the “guardian vs developer” contin-
uum – the role space of “initiator vs follower” can be characterized by contradictory 
attitudes and demands, especially in the Estonian and Latvian context. The fiscal 
bureaucrats in those countries complain that the politicians do not listen to their 
advice but at the same time, they would like elected officials to be clearer in their 
directions and more decisive. In those two countries, the civil servants feel that in a 
democracy, the politicians should play a major role in fiscal policy but, at the same 
time, believe that the civil servants should play a dominant role in fiscal policy 
because the politicians cannot always be trusted to act responsibly. Indeed, the glar-
ing contrast between how much the Baltic (especially Latvian) officials distrust the 
politicians and how much more positively the Norwegian bureaucrats view the 
elected officials is one of the starkest differences we found from a comparative per-
spective. Another important observation that emerged from the interviews is that 
when we ask fiscal bureaucracies whether they feel free to propose policies and give 
advice, the reported “freedom” can also be constrained by self-censorship.
4. Insulators vs Mediators
In addition to the “faces” of fiscal bureaucracy in their relations with the political 
principals, the line ministries and the EU, the civil servants can also assume differ-
ent roles in how they interact with independent actors outside the government. 
Given the potential contributions academics and social partners (i.e. the employees’ 
and employers’ associations) can make to fiscal policy-making, we zoom in on 
whether the fiscal bureaucracies view themselves as “mediating” these inputs or, in 
contrast, attempt to “insulate” fiscal policy-making from these influences.
4.1 Academia
The fiscal bureaucracy can serve the role of “mediators” between knowledge sup-
pliers in academia and the government (Howlett 2011) or, in contrast, attempt to 
“insulate” fiscal policy-making from ongoing academic debates and analyses. Aca-
demic studies can be used for raising issues, formulating new policies, evaluating 
existing programmes, changing ways of thinking, and mobilizing support (Weiss 
and Bucuvalas 1980). Scholarly research can be utilized before a policy-related deci-
sion is taken or used afterwards for confirming or legitimizing a decision already 
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taken (Rich 1997; Schrefler 2010). In Weiss’s (1980) terminology, by bringing in 
academic research to the policy-making process, civil servants can also trigger 
“knowledge creep” throughout the organization. Thus, the permeability of the fiscal 
bureaucracies to academia can potentially play a relevant role in policy-making 
(Campbell and Pedersen 2011; Hall 1989; Pekkarinen 1989; Weir 1989; Weir and 
Skocpol 1985). The more open the civil servants are to advice from outside econo-
mists, the faster the developments in economic theory can be incorporated into 
policy; conversely, the more insulated the bureaucracy is from academic advice, the 
more slowly the policy shifts are likely to unfold (Hall 1989; Weir 1989).
According to “rationalistic” approaches to policy-making, civil servants system-
atically seek out and use policy-relevant research in their policy field in order to 
enhance policy outcomes (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Howlett 2009; 2011; Schrefler 
2010). Also, Hansen and Ejersbo (2002) argue that administrators are more likely to 
be driven by “deductive” logic of action, whereas politicians follow a more “induc-
tive” logic. Given the “deductive” logic followed by academia, civil servants can 
hence play an important role since it follows their “deductive” orientation as well.
Many studies, however, have pointed to rather limited use of scholarly research 
in policy learning (Caplan 1979; Howlett 2011; Landry et al. 2003; Oh 1996; Rich 
and Oh 2000), resulting from problems in both the supply and demand of scholarly 
research. First, in order to be utilized for policy learning, pertinent research on the 
policy issues has to be produced by the academics in the first place (Weiss and 
Bucuvalas 1980). Second, civil servants may face time and resource constraints in 
collecting, analyzing and interpreting the research findings from the academic com-
munity (Howlett 2009; Wildavsky 1969), especially if the interactions between the 
two communities are limited (Landry et al. 2003). Also, the language of scholarly 
research may not be easily accessible to civil servants, and the focus of the studies 
may not correspond to their informational needs (Caplan 1979; Landry et al. 2003). 
Third, the civil servants belonging to the fiscal bureaucracy – in light of the ideo-
logical aspects of fiscal policy – may face pressures to follow the ideological line of 
the elected officials in power and hence discount scholarly evidence that goes against 
the prevailing ideological position (Hird 2005).
On the scale of “mediators vs insulators”, the fiscal bureaucracies in Estonia and 
Latvia appear to be closer to the insulator end. All interviewees noted that there are 
no formal routines for interacting with the academics, and if there are contacts, these 
are based on informal personal networks. Most of the interviewees in both countries 
noted that they do not have the time to read academic works, and if they do read 
anything “academic”, it usually comes from the EU, the OECD or the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). As one of the Estonian officials explained it, “In the European 
Union, there is a big machinery that digests the academic studies and we can get an 
overview from them. I don’t keep a close eye on academic discussions but I do pay 
attention when these discussions reach to the level of the EU or IMF” (Interview E2). 
Thus, it appears that the “follower” role vis-à-vis international organizations – dis-
cussed in the previous section – can spill over to absorbing academic studies as well.
The Estonian officials complained that the research conducted in Estonia on fis-
cal policy issues often lags behind policy needs or is driven by specific ideological 
positions. In the words of an interviewee, “In many cases, the academics don’t have 
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the most recent information and it takes time until they figure things out” (Interview 
E2). In Latvia, several interviewees noted that there is almost no research or aca-
demic debate conducted in Latvia about fiscal and/or budgetary policy.
In Sweden and Norway, in contrast, our interviews indicate that the fiscal 
bureaucracies appear to be closer to the “mediator” than the “insulator” part of the 
scale: they have more systematic and open interactions with the academics in their 
countries.
The interviewees in Sweden noted that several aspects of the Swedish fiscal 
framework (e.g. the fiscal council, the expenditure ceilings) were inspired by aca-
demic research. One of the Swedish officials explained that when Andres Borg came 
to office, he wanted to have more PhD level economists in the MoF and also “more 
academic research to back up their claims on what they wanted to do”. Borg “thought 
of himself as being very academic and wanted to use modern research to find the best 
way forward” (Interview S3).
In Norway, most of the interviewees noted that they are not able to follow aca-
demic debates and read scholarly works as much as they would like to, due to time 
constraints, but academic research does play a role in the decision-making on fiscal 
policy. As one of the interviewees explained, “Before we introduced the fiscal rule, 
we scanned the economic literature on those kind of topics to see what’s done in 
other countries and what is written in academic journals” (Interview N2). Another 
official noted, “The question the ministry faces at the moment is: what should be the 
equity share of the pension fund. Should we increase it to 70 or 80 per cent or should 
it be reduced to 50? In that discussion, they of course draw on the research front 
internationally. When we have that kind of questions, then we are, of course, reading 
a lot” (Interview N2). At the same time, the interviewee added, “But we are a min-
istry and not a research institution, so most of our work is in between academics and 
politicians” (Interview N2).
Importantly, regular contacts between academics and the fiscal bureaucracy in 
Norway take place via committees, established for various topics. One of the inter-
viewees noted that these committees also summarize current academic knowledge on 
the topic (Interview N2). Another interviewee remarked, “A few years ago we estab-
lished a modelling committee, where academics from the outside take part. Mainly 
professors, alongside in-house experts, as participants” (Interview N1). As men-
tioned in section 3, the MoF officials are actively involved in such committees them-
selves, which provides them with regular exposure to the academics. Such an attitude 
towards committees contrasts clearly with what was observed in the Estonian case, 
where all of the interviews were sceptical of using the committee format. One of the 
interviewed officials even quipped, “If we don’t want to solve a problem, we set up 
a committee” (Interview E2). With regard to involving outsiders in discussing mod-
els, another Estonian interviewee noted, “There are no open discussions about mod-
els: it is technical work and there is not much to discuss” (Interview E1).
In addition to the topical committees, the MoF officials in Norway took the ini-
tiative in setting up an academic advisory panel to the ministry: “We felt we needed 
to have a more regular contact with the academic world” (Interview N3). This panel 
is a forum for discussion of state-of-the-art research (models and methods), not for 
policy advice. The interviewee noted that the advisory panel has been very useful for 
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the ministry but also for the academics who have participated: “Fiscal policy is 
really very interesting, but no ministries of finance have research departments. And 
the universities and academics find it more difficult to analyze fiscal policy because 
it is so complex and so difficult to understand. By having an advisory panel and more 
regular contacts, it is easier for them to read budget documents. And it may open up 
more research on fiscal policy, which would be good, I think” (Interview N3).
4.2 The social partners
In addition to acting as mediators between academia and policy-making, bureau-
crats can influence which interest groups would be included in policy-making and 
which not (Rose 1987; Page 1987). Interest groups could be the source of expertise 
that can be used by officials to enhance their position, and civil servants could also 
be involved in mobilizing consent from the interest groups (Rose 1987). We were 
specifically interested in whether the fiscal bureaucracies play a role in mediating 
the positions of the social partners (i.e. employers’ unions and trade unions) in fiscal 
policy-making. Varieties of capitalism research have long argued that different insti-
tutional frameworks provide different kinds of engagement opportunities for inter-
est groups. Coordinated market economies rely on a complex web of socio-political 
and administrative relations with institutional pathways to engage social partners 
while liberal market economies rely on fluid competitive institutions, where access 
and engagement patterns can shift quickly (Hall and Soskice 2001). While Norway 
and Sweden represent coordinated market economies, the neoliberal Estonia and 
Latvia are closer to the liberal model (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). In our context, 
the exact features of different types of capitalism matter less than an overall expec-
tation that the economic and institutional context would predict a different role for 
fiscal bureaucracies, as well, vis-à-vis social partners.
In Estonia, Latvia and Sweden, the fiscal bureaucrats themselves appear to have 
no regular or formal contacts with the representatives of social partners. The inter-
viewees remarked that while the social partners may have more direct contacts with 
elected officials, the bureaucracy does not play a mediating role here. As for Sweden, 
that country had fairly extensive corporatist consultation through the early post-war 
period, but there was a striking reversal since the early 1990s. Employers exited from 
all such cooperative boards, and the union confederation (LO) has been significantly 
weakened. One of the Swedish interviewees noted that while labour party politicians 
of course have ties with the unions, “there are no organized meetings with the social 
partners in the finance ministry where we would discuss the budget for the next 
years” (Interview S6). In Estonia, the officials noted that it would not even be mean-
ingful to directly involve the social partners in fiscal policy discussions. One of the 
interviewees put it as follows, “It is already known what the position is – so there is 
no point in asking” (Interview E3). Another noted, “It would only make sense to 
involve them if they [the social partners] were a lot smarter and understood the eco-
nomic cycle and other budgetary issues” (Interview E2).
In Norway, the fiscal bureaucrats have more direct contacts with the social part-
ners through the above-mentioned committees. As one of the interviewees explained 
it, if the finance ministry is faced with a problem, it creates a committee and invites 
24
Different Faces of Fiscal Bureaucracy
external actors to participate in it, and depending on the topic of the commission, 
social partners can also be included (Interview N1). Another added that the social 
partners “influence [fiscal policy-making] through their participation in commis-
sions – that is an important channel for them” (Interview N4).
In sum, the fiscal bureaucracies in Estonia and Latvia fall closer to the “insula-
tor” end of the continuum both with regard to academics and social partners. In 
Sweden, they play a more extensive mediator role with academics but less so with 
social partners, whereas in Norway the fiscal bureaucrats are close to the mediator 
end of the spectrum vis-à-vis both sets of actors. In the Estonian and Latvian cases, 
it is interesting to observe that alongside politicians, the fiscal bureaucrats also dis-
trust other local societal actors – like academics and social partners – whereas they 
have extensive trust in the machinery of the EU “digesting” worthwhile academic 
materials for them. In the Norwegian case, it appears that the regular interactions 
fiscal bureaucracies have with the academics and social partners via committees help 
to build a more trustful stance of the civil servants towards those actors, which, con-
versely, addresses and alleviates some of the supply problems that can often under-
mine the utilization of academic research in policy-making.
5. Modellers vs Estimators
In their role as analysts, fiscal bureaucracies can vary with regard to how exten-
sively they use sophisticated (macroeconomic) models for their work. This was a 
clear difference that emerged from comparing the cases covered in our study: the 
fiscal bureaucrats in Estonia and Latvia use relatively simple models, whereas their 
Swedish and especially Norwegian counterparts use elaborate and complicated 
models.8 Although there have been studies that have spelled out the implications of 
macroeconomic models for policy-making (e.g. Chari and Kehoe 2006) and make 
normative recommendations about how such models could be used in fiscal policy 
(e.g. Kremer et al. 2006), the literature on how models are actually used in policy 
work is considerably “thinner” (den Butter and Morgan 1998, 445). Indeed, we 
could not find any “positively oriented” theoretical works that systematically dis-
cussed the use of models by fiscal bureaucracies and could serve as a foundation for 
comparative analyses. Thus, the discussion on the “modeller vs estimator” continu-
um we are proposing here is very much exploratory in nature and could be used as 
a starting point for more systematic analyses in the future.
As our interviews indicate, in Estonia and Latvia, the fiscal bureaucracies use 
smaller models for estimating tax revenues and expenditures but do not utilize a 
general macroeconomic model. On the one hand, the Estonian officials noted that 
they do not have capacities for developing and using such a model. As one of the 
interviewees remarked, “The central bank has a macroeconomic equilibrium model 
but they also have ten analysts with PhDs working on it; we [in MoF] have alto-
gether three analysts working with economic analysis” (Interview E3). Another 
noted, “In Sweden and Denmark, for example, they have long time frames on the 
8  A comparison of macroeconomic expertise and use of models in all five Nordic countries is available 
in Mjøset (2011, 399-408).
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individual level: consumption, wage changes, etc. They have more capacity to build 
models. We don’t have statistical capacities to collect such data” (Interview E1). On 
the other hand, the Estonian officials expressed scepticism whether using a macro-
economic model would make sense in the Estonian context, given the short period 
for which data is available, the volatility of the economy and ongoing structural 
changes (Interviews E1, E2). Similarly, in the Latvian context, the fiscal bureaucrats 
expressed scepticism with regard to how useful a general equilibrium model (e.g. 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model) would be for fiscal policy-
making. As in Estonia, they referred to the lack of data and short time frames, “For 
structural models you need input-output tables, which, for the period of the last 20 
years we probably have for three years” (Interview L4). The interviewee added, “I 
know that the Bank of Latvia has developed a general equilibrium (DSGE) model, 
but the reliability of this model in the Latvian conditions is … let’s say expert evalu-
ation at times is more reliable and better” (Interview L4).
Increasingly, however, in both countries there are more extensive debates on 
which models to use in estimating the cyclical position of the economy and its impact 
on budgetary fiscal policy due to the fiscal rules of the Fiscal Compact. As shown by 
Raudla et al. (2016a, b), the diverging assessments of the cyclical position of the 
economy by the EU and the MoFs have triggered discussions on the models used in 
fiscal policy-making in both countries.
In Norway, there is already a long tradition of using extensive macro-economic 
models in budgetary and fiscal policy-making (Bjerkholt 1998). Currently, the main 
model used is called Modag – a big and detailed input-output-based model in the 
Cowles commission tradition, maintained by Statistics Norway for the government 
– in the fiscal policy-making process, inter alia, for assessing the effects of fiscal 
policy on the economy (Interviews N2, N3, N5).9 One of the Norwegian interview-
ees emphasized that for the purposes of fiscal policy, the MoF needed a lot more 
detailed input on the public sector than a typical DSGE model had (Interview N1), 
as the latter relied on national accounts data only, not on input-output tables.10 
Indeed, while in other countries, the input-output analyses have been used for long-
term planning, in Norway, they are also used for short-term planning in fiscal policy. 
Also, in other countries, the macroeconomic models used are much more aggregated, 
whereas in Norway, the models are highly detailed, comprising thousands of entries 
(Bjerkholt 1998). Another official noted, however, that over time, the role of the 
Modag model has diminished and the analyses are complemented with input from 
other smaller models and also expert analysis. As he explained: “So it helps us, but 
it does not have the same prominent role as it may have had before, going back 15-20 
years. … We don’t think that the model has all the mechanisms that are in operation 
in the economy. Often you need to think outside the model. … So very often the 
results that we present in our analysis and in the budget paper are partly based on 
Modag, partly our own judgement, and partly also other models.” (Interview N3) 
Since 2017, a new, quarterly version of Modag, now called Kvarts, will be supplied 
9  The interviewees also noted that it is a very Keynesian model (Interview N2).
10  For overviews of the development of different economic models used in Norway, see Bjerkholt 
(1998).
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by Statistics Norway to MoF. The change from a yearly to a quarterly version will 
improve on some of the challenges mentioned.
In using the models like Kvarts, the MoF relies significantly on Statistics 
Norway (SN), which has the right to collect detailed data from firms and households. 
SN is exceptional when compared to other statistical bureaus in the world for it not 
only collects data but also has a large economic research department – in fact one of 
the largest research institutions in Norway – that builds and runs macro, micro and 
tax models (Anderson et al. 2006; Bjerkholt 1998). In developing the models the SN 
takes into account the specific needs MoF has for fiscal and budgetary policy-mak-
ing. Indeed, the development of the different models has emerged from close interac-
tions between the officials in the MoF and SN – and the models serve the specific 
needs of using the national budget as a planning tool (Bjerkholt 1998). Historically, 
Norway developed a specific constellation – called the “iron triangle” – between the 
national economics profession, the MoF and the applied research unit at SN (Mjøset 
2011). However, since the 1990s, views within the economics profession have 
become more diverse, the central bank has its own research units based on DSGE 
models (although much smaller than in Sweden), and lately, some political networks 
have also become more sceptical about the key role of SN’s macroeconomic 
researchers. Our Norwegian interviews indicated that some of the MoF’s fiscal pol-
icy bureaucrats want to work with a broader selection of models. As already noted, 
MoF now also has a panel where professors together with in-house experts meet and 
discuss regularly (Interview N1).
In Sweden, as well, the fiscal bureaucracy is using several macroeconomic mod-
els. The interviewees had a critical stance towards the “mainstream” DSGE model 
used by the central bank, since it did not include a financial sector or unemployment. 
Hence, in the models they use themselves, they also include “the stock market, the 
housing market, how it affects wealth, and wealth affects consumption, for instance. 
So there is a link between the financial sector and the real sector in the economy” 
(Interview S5). However, the main centre for macroeconomic theory in Sweden is 
the central bank, and it works exclusively with DSGE-models. The macroeconomic 
modelling pursued in other units is empiricist exercises with econometrics. The dif-
ference to Norway in this respect is considerable.
In sum, the fiscal bureaucrats in Sweden and Norway are closer to the “mod-
eller” end of the continuum than the Estonian and Latvian officials. Still, it is worth 
noting that even in the case of Norway, the fiscal bureaucrats do not just blindly trust 
their sophisticated models but use them cautiously.
It is likely that the location on this continuum can intersect in important ways 
with the other abovementioned roles. Indeed, it can be conjectured that the more 
elaborate and sophisticated models available to the fiscal bureaucrats in Sweden and 
Norway also enable them to play a more confident role as a “developer”. On the 
other hand, a more active mediator role vis-à-vis the academics can also allow the 
fiscal bureaucracies in those countries to improve their models. Also, as our explor-
atory analysis indicates, the resources available for the fiscal bureaucrats to develop 
and use macroeconomic models is an important dimension: the use and maintenance 
of sophisticated models is more feasible in more prosperous countries and more chal-
lenging in the less wealthy ones.
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6. Discussion and Conclusion
In light of the growing importance of finance ministries and the “financial” dimen-
sion in policy-making, opening up the “black box” of fiscal bureaucracies is more 
warranted than ever. The goal of our paper was to put forth a set of dichotomies − or, 
continuums, to be more precise – for analyzing, in a more nuanced way than has 
been done in the academic literature so far, the different roles of fiscal bureaucra-
cies. We used the proposed dichotomies – developers vs guardians, initiators vs 
followers, mediators vs insulators and modellers vs estimators – to explore the fiscal 
bureaucracies in Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Norway. Figure 1 depicts the different 
roles of fiscal bureaucracies we have discussed in this paper and the main interac-
tions with other actors these roles entail.
The taxonomy we proposed served as a useful heuristic for exploring the simi-
larities and differences between the countries but also within them. Overall, we can 
see that fiscal bureaucracies in Estonia and Latvia tend to be closer to the guardian-
insulator-estimator ends of the continuums, whereas the officials in Sweden and 
especially Norway lean towards the developer-mediator-modeller end of the scale. 
This can be related to the basic contrasts that we mentioned at the outset. As young 
democracies, relatively recent additions to a Western European world marked by 
tense interplay between financialization and European integration since 2008, the 
fiscal policy bureaucracies of Estonia and Latvia cannot draw on much national 
capacity in their fields. They thus emphasize the traditional treasury, “guardian” role, 
they strive to insulate economic policy decisions from both politicians, academics 
and social partners. In terms of macroeconomic assessment, they also show more 
dependence on the EU than what Sweden does. Our two Nordic cases, in contrast, 
are richer countries with institutions that link expert knowledge (data and models) to 
economic policy-making. They have more capacity both for fine-tuning and struc-
tural policies that develop the economy. Still, the differences are considerable 
between Sweden and Norway, with the latter displaying stronger institutional conti-
nuities with the early post-war period. In Sweden, patterns of mediation are not as 
strong as they used to be, and the models are general ones based on aggregate 
national accounts data. These contrasts have grown since the 1970s, as Norway 
embarked on its development as an oil-exporting economy, while in Sweden, manu-
facturing firms became highly internationalized, making industrial interests less reli-
ant on the state.
The division between the initiator vs follower roles is less clear-cut. In Estonia 
and Latvia, the fiscal bureaucrats tend to serve the initiator role domestically but are 
clearly in the follower position in the context of the supra-national decision-making 
of the EU. In Norway, the fiscal bureaucrats are freer vis-à-vis the international 
dimension but tend to give the politicians a more prominent role than in the other 
countries. Even Sweden is closer to this “village life” pattern.
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Figure 1: Different roles of Fiscal Bureaucracy
Our interviews also indicate that fiscal bureaucrats often have to balance contradic-
tory demands placed on them and, indeed, their “faces” appear paradoxical at times. 
For example, the officials feel that politicians should listen to their advice but they 
also expect the elected officials to be more decisive and know what they want (e.g. 
in Latvia). Or, they claim that fiscal policy should be used counter-cyclically but are 
reluctant to incur loans (as in Estonia and Latvia). Or, they claim that they are “free” 
to make policy proposals but at the same time, exercise self-censorship, since 
“everybody knows which proposals are welcome and which not” (e.g. in Estonia).
Delineating the taxonomy for exploring the different roles of fiscal bureaucracies 
is, obviously, only the very first step in shedding more academically driven light on 
those policy actors. It can be used as a starting point for both further theorizing and 
empirical studies in the following ways.
First, further research could extend the number of countries covered and explore 
closer the possible configurations of roles. For example, are developers usually also 
modellers? If we assume that using fiscal policy for economic development policies 
needs sophisticated models, this is likely to be the case. Are the insulators more 
likely to be guardians than developers? If there are fewer interactions with societal 
interest groups, it might be “easier” to retain the role of the guardian given that the 
demands for development have fewer opportunities for entering the agenda. Are 
guardians usually followers or initiators? As emerged from our interviews, the 
Estonian and Latvian fiscal bureaucrats’ follower role vis-à-vis the EU has strength-
ened their guardian role vis-à-vis line ministries due to stricter fiscal rules imposed 
by the EU. Are modellers usually also mediators? As we could see, especially from 
the Norwegian case, the use of sophisticated models in fiscal policy-making benefit 
greatly from extensive interactions with academia and other knowledge producers 
(e.g. statistical offices).
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Second, different subtypes under each category we have proposed can be developed. 
For example, the “developer” category can be divided further into “visionaries” vs 
“fine-tuners”, “infrastructure promoters vs promoters of broader societal invest-
ments”, “conveyers of international funds vs domestic fund-raisers” etc. The 
“guardian” category could be subdivided into “rule imposers” vs “negotiators”. 
Under the “mediator” role, we have only discussed interactions with the social part-
ners and the academics, but the list of actors could be expanded to include other 
types of interest groups.
Third, the interactions between the dichotomies are worth exploring further. For 
example, in their follower-role vis-à-vis the EU, the Estonian and Latvian fiscal 
bureaucrats have used the structural funds for “development” purposes and hence 
have had to assume increasing “developer” roles. Also, in the Baltic countries, espe-
cially in Latvia, the follower role vis-à-vis the EU means that the “guardian” role has 
become re-emphasized due to the stricter fiscal rules imposed by the EU.
Fourth, Figure 1 depicts only the most basic (and predominant) interactions. In 
reality, the number of external actors involved in the “picture” is considerably larger 
and the interactions are likely to be overlapping as well. The “guardian vs developer” 
role could also entail interactions with the elected officials, statistical offices, central 
banks, the social partners, and the EU. For example, in Norway, the “developer” role 
of the fiscal bureaucrats is influenced by academia, the statistical office and the 
social partners. The modeller vs estimator role can also include interrelations with 
the EU (as it is in Estonia and Latvia) and with the social partners (as is the case in 
Norway). The societal interest groups can also influence the line ministries and 
elected officials directly, which would then influence the dynamics that the fiscal 
bureaucracies have with them. The figure and our discussion focuses on the EU as 
the main “external actor”, but further studies could expand the list of international 
organizations (encompass, inter alia, the OECD, the IMF, and the WB). All these 
more complex interactions could be explored closer in future studies.
Finally, the next steps would involve using this taxonomy (and the configura-
tions of different roles) both as explanans and explanandum.
On the one hand, scholars could be interested in explaining how fiscal bureaucra-
cies in different countries end up in specific role configurations and uncovering what 
kind of factors influence that. The configurations of the roles fiscal bureaucracies 
play are likely to be influenced by overall political and administrative culture, 
political institutions, recruitment patterns, civil service systems, civil service train-
ing, and resource constraints (Christensen 2013; Chwieroth 2009; Fourcade 2009; 
Heclo 1974; Krause 2009; Marier 2005; Peters 2001, 2002). For example, special-
ized bureaucracies may identify more strongly with professional norms and be more 
open to new economic ideas – encouraging them to take a more activist approach in 
policy advice, whereas generalist bureaucracies might identify more closely with the 
norms of civil service as such, including the boundaries between the role of bureau-
crats and elected officials, and hence adopt a more constrained stance towards policy 
advice (Christensen 2013). Also, open recruitment systems are likely to draw on 
more extensive expertise and allow easier inflow of new economic ideas (Christensen 
2013). In addition, the institutional landscape outside the MoF is likely to influence 
the roles of fiscal bureaucrats. For example, having a Statistical Office which collects 
30
Different Faces of Fiscal Bureaucracy
statistics but also has a large research department with extensive capacities in mac-
roeconomic modelling provides useful inputs for the “modeller” role of the MoF in 
Norway. The level of affluence is also likely to influence the configurations of roles 
that fiscal bureaucracies in different countries assume. According to our case studies, 
the developer-mediator-modeller configuration is more characteristic to affluent 
countries (Sweden and Norway), while the guardian-insulator-estimator configura-
tion can be observed in the less affluent countries of Estonia and Latvia. Further 
studies could explore that link systematically and examine the potential mechanisms 
that link the level of prosperity to the roles fiscal bureaucracies assume.
On the other hand, it would be fruitful to examine the impacts of the different 
role configurations on policy outcomes, e.g. in terms of economic development, fis-
cal indicators, and societal indicators.
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Appendix 1: Interviews with fiscal bureaucrats
Estonia:
E1: 18 August 2014
E2: 9 September 2014
E3: 9 September 2014
E4: 10 September 2014
E5: 18 August 2014
Latvia:
L1: 16 September 2014
L2: 17 September 2014
L3: 17 September 2014
L4: 13 October 2014
L5: 20 October 2014
L6: 5 June 2015
Norway:
N1: 8 June 2016
N2: 8 June 2016
N3: 16 June 2016
N4: 16 June 2016
N5: 17 June 2016
Sweden:
S1: 21 October 2015
S2: 21 October 2015
S3: 10 March 2016
S4: 10 March 2016
S5: 10 March 2016
S6: 14 March 2016
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